Talk with G.E. Moore

G.E. Moore, or George Edward Moore, was an influential English philosopher born on November 4, 1873, and died on October 24, 1958. He was a key figure in the analytic philosophy tradition, making significant contributions to philosophy of language, ethics, and epistemology. Moore is perhaps best known for his robust defense of common sense beliefs and his arguments against skepticism.

Moore studied and later taught at Cambridge University, where he became a prominent member of the intellectual group known as the Bloomsbury Group. His most notable works include Principia Ethica (1903) and "A Defence of Common Sense" (1925). In Principia Ethica, he introduced the "naturalistic fallacy," which is an argument against the identification of good with any natural property, such as pleasure or desire satisfaction. This book had a profound influence on the development of analytic philosophy and on the later work of philosophers like Ludwig Wittgenstein and Bertrand Russell.

Moore's methodology often involved meticulous analysis of philosophical problems through common language and intuitively clear propositions. He famously used "Moore's Paradox" to illustrate a point about belief and assertion, stating that sentences like "It is raining, but I do not believe that it is raining" are paradoxically odd yet possibly true.

His work in epistemology and his emphasis on the analysis of philosophical language laid groundwork for later analytic philosophers, and his legacy in philosophy is marked by his rigorous and clear style of argumentation and his defense of common sense and ordinary language analysis.

G.E. Moore's critique of utilitarianism, particularly through his concept of the "naturalistic fallacy," presents a significant philosophical challenge to utilitarian ethics. According to Moore, the naturalistic fallacy is the error of defining ethical terms, like "good," in terms of natural properties, such as pleasure or happiness.

In his seminal work, "Principia Ethica" (1903), Moore argues that "good" is a simple, indefinable quality that cannot be equated with any natural property. This concept is central to his argument against utilitarianism, which traditionally holds that the rightness of an action is determined by its tendency to promote the greatest happiness.

Moore contends that utilitarianism's approach commits the naturalistic fallacy because it attempts to define "good" in terms of the natural property of pleasure or happiness. He argues that pleasure is not identically "good," and that something could hypothetically increase pleasure without being morally good. Thus, there could be situations where the greatest happiness is not equivalent to the greatest good.

By insisting that "good" is a unique, non-natural quality that cannot be empirically derived or simplified to any form of natural consequence like happiness, Moore sets a significant critique against utilitarianism's foundational principle. This drives a philosophical wedge between the concepts of ethical good and natural outcomes, challenging utilitarians to justify or reformulate their position regarding the basis of moral goodness.

G.E. Moore's critique of Kant's ethics can be understood primarily through his broader ethical framework, particularly his emphasis on ethical non-naturalism and the concept of intrinsic value, as articulated in his seminal work "Principia Ethica." Moore's approach diverges significantly from Kant's in several key aspects:

1. Nature of Ethics and Non-Naturalism: Moore is famous for his argument against what he called the "naturalistic fallacy," which he believed many philosophers, including Kant, committed. This fallacy, according to Moore, involves wrongly identifying good with some natural property such as pleasure (utilitarianism) or perhaps even Kant’s notion of duty. Moore argued that "good" is a simple, indefinable quality that cannot be equated with any natural or metaphysical property. Kant, on the other hand, grounds his ethics in the concept of duty and the categorical imperative, which Moore might critique as an unjustifiable leap from natural human faculties (like reason) to metaphysical ethical laws.

2. Intrinsic Value: Moore argues that certain things (like beauty or pleasure) possess intrinsic value, valuable in themselves, independent of their consequences. This contrasts with Kant’s deontological framework, where the rightness or wrongness of actions does not primarily depend on their consequences but on whether they fulfil a duty determined by the categorical imperative. Moore might argue that Kant overlooks the inherent value of certain states of affairs or experiences by focusing strictly on adherence to duty as the basis of moral evaluation.

3. Moral Epistemology: Moore’s intuitionism suggests that we can directly perceive or intuit moral qualities like good. Kant, conversely, would argue that moral law is known through practical reason, and not through intuition. Moore might critique Kant’s approach as overly rationalistic and detached from the direct moral perceptions that, according to Moore, are foundational to ethical knowledge.

4. Universality and Objectivity: Both philosophers uphold the objectivity of moral judgments, but they conceive it differently. Kant emphasizes universality and the formulation of maxims that can be universally applied. Moore, although he agrees that morality is objective, is less concerned with universalizability per se than with the objective good or bad status of particular states of affairs.

5. Autonomy and Freedom: Kant places significant emphasis on autonomy and freedom, viewing the ability to act according to a law one gives oneself as central to moral action. Moore does not emphasize autonomy in the same way; his primary concern is with the intrinsic goodness of states of affairs rather than the self-legislative capacity of moral agents.

In sum, while Moore might respect Kant’s rigor and his commitment to the objectivity of ethics, he would likely argue that Kant’s ethical system is flawed by the misidentification of moral good with concepts (like duty) that do not adequately capture the true, non-natural property of goodness. Moore's broader project in ethics attempts to refocus philosophical attention on the immediate apprehension of good itself, which he believes is resistant to the kind of systematic theorization that Kant pursues.

G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell were both pivotal figures in the early 20th century philosophical movement of analytic philosophy, and while they shared many views, particularly in their emphasis on clarity, analysis, and attention to language, they also had notable differences in their philosophical approaches and doctrines.

1. Philosophical Methods: Both philosophers stressed the importance of precise analysis, but Moore is particularly noted for his common sense approach, where he often began with ordinary language and common beliefs as a basis of philosophical inquiry. Russell, by contrast, was more inclined towards formal logic and mathematics as tools for solving philosophical problems. Russell developed a type of logicism in mathematics, aiming to show that mathematical truths were a part of logical truths, which contrasted with Moore’s more empirical and less formal approach.

2. Metaphysics and Realism: Moore’s defense of common sense realism (he famously argued against idealism directly in his early essays) was somewhat different from Russell’s evolving views on external reality. Russell’s work went through various phases including his commitment to Platonism, logical atomism, and later, a form of neutral monism. Moore, meanwhile, maintained a more steadfast commitment to the existence of the external world as it appears to us.

3. Ethics: Moore's most famous contribution to ethics is his work Principia Ethica, where he argues that ‘good’ is a simple, undefinable property and introduces the idea of the "naturalistic fallacy". Russell, while also a moral realist for a time, approached ethics through a more utilitarian lens, influenced by the likes of Mill and the consequentialist approach, which focuses more on the outcomes of actions rather than their inherent qualities.

4. Philosophy of Language: Russell’s theory of descriptions was a groundbreaking development in the philosophy of language, offering a way to handle the reference of linguistic phrases, especially in the context of non-existing entities. Moore’s contributions here were less revolutionary, though his careful, meticulous style of analysis did influence how subsequent philosophers approached language.

Overall, while both philosophers shared a commitment to a kind of realism and the use of analysis, their methods and some of their philosophical conclusions diverged significantly. Moore’s work was often characterized by a rigorously common-sense approach, whereas Russell was more willing to rethink and reconstruct traditional philosophical attitudes through formal logic and the theory of knowledge.

G.E. Moore's theories of perception, particularly his defense of common sense and his emphasis on the directness of perceptual experience, have had a notable influence on modern philosophy, especially in the realms of epistemology and the philosophy of perception.

Moore was a staunch defender of common sense realism—the idea that the world is generally as we perceive it to be. He argued that sensory experiences provide direct access to external objects, and he famously posited in his "Proof of an External World" that here is one hand, here is another, and here are two hands, and so there are at least two external objects in the world, thus proving the existence of the external world directly and straightforwardly via perception.

This insistence on the transparency of perceptual experience and the reliability of common sense has influenced various strands of philosophical thought:

1. Phenomenology: Philosophers like Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, though different in their approaches and conclusions from Moore, also emphasized the immediacy of perception, but incorporated a more nuanced analysis of how objects are constituted in experience.

2. Analytic Philosophy: Moore’s influence here is substantial, fostering an environment that valued rigorous argumentation and clarity. His approach to philosophy as analysis of concepts and defense of ordinary language had a significant impact on later philosophers such as Ludwig Wittgenstein and J.L. Austin, who similarly stressed everyday language and common experiences in their philosophical analyses.

3. Realism and Anti-Skepticism: Moore’s work directly combats philosophical skepticism. His arguments have inspired contemporary defenders of common sense and realism, for example, in Hilary Putnam’s and Michael Huemer’s epistemological works, which similarly attempt to establish a more secure footing for believing in an objectively knowable, external world based on perceptual and cognitive faculties.

4. Moorean Shifts in Epistemology: Moore influenced epistemology by shifting focus toward the conditions and nature of knowledge itself, influencing subsequent debates on foundationalism, coherentism, and the nature of justifiable belief.

While not all modern philosophers agree with Moore's conclusions or methods, his emphasis on the certainties of everyday experiences has provoked significant discussions and critiques in philosophy concerning the nature of perception, reality, and knowledge. His work laid groundwork that has been built upon, refuted, or revised in numerous ways across different philosophical movements.

G.E. Moore, a prominent philosopher in the early 20th century, is known for his significant contributions to ethics, epistemology, and the philosophy of language. Some of his most influential books include:

1. Principia Ethica (1903) - This is perhaps Moore's most famous work, in which he argues for the indefinability of "good" and introduces the notion of ethical non-naturalism. This book had a profound impact on the development of analytic philosophy and ethical theory.

2. Ethics (1912) - In this book, Moore continues his exploration of ethical themes, focusing on topics like the nature of good, conduct, and the objective reality of moral claims.

3. Some Main Problems of Philosophy (1953) - This work focuses on more general philosophical issues rather than purely ethical ones, touching on topics like perception, reality, and the nature of philosophical analysis.

4. Philosophical Studies (1922) - This collection of essays covers a variety of topics across Moore's philosophical interests, including epistemology and the philosophy of language.

Throughout his works, Moore is known for his rigorous analysis and clear, precise use of language, which helped set the stage for the analytic tradition in philosophy.

The "G.E. Moore shift" is a response to a philosophical problem concerning skepticism, specifically in the context of discussing external world skepticism. This problem typically arises in debates about whether we can truly know anything about the external world.

The issue at hand usually begins with a skeptic proposing an argument such as:

1. If I know that here is a hand, then I must know that I am not a brain in a vat (BIV).
2. I do not know that I am not a BIV.
3. Therefore, I do not know here is a hand.

G.E. Moore's response to such skeptical arguments is not to directly attack the premises as one might expect. Instead, he famously makes a shift in the order of the premises. Moore agrees with the reasoning but denies the skeptic's conclusion by reversing the premises, using what has come to be known as 'Moorean facts' (obvious truths, like "here is a hand") to refute skepticism. His version would look something like:

1. If I know that here is a hand, then I must know that I am not a BIV.
2. I know here is a hand.
3. Therefore, I must know that I am not a BIV.

This shift effectively uses a common-sense claim to challenge the skeptic’s premise. Moore's argument hinges on the belief that certain ordinary knowledge claims (like knowing one has hands) are more secure and more reasonable to accept than the skeptical hypotheses (like the possibility of being a BIV). Thus, Moore shifts the burden of proof back to the skeptic to refute our common-sense knowledge.

For a comprehensive bibliography of G.E. Moore's works, you can look into several key resources:

1. Books and Academic Libraries: Many libraries, especially those in universities with strong philosophy departments, will have extensive holdings of Moore's works and related secondary literature. The library catalog would typically list all the titles available.

2. Academic Databases: Databases like JSTOR, PhilPapers, and the Philosophy Documentation Center often have comprehensive bibliographies and access to both primary texts by Moore and secondary literature about his work.

3. Moore's Collected Works: "The Collected Works of G.E. Moore," if available, would provide a great deal of his philosophical writings, possibly along with bibliographical information as curated by the editors.

4. Books on Moore's Philosophy: Certain books dedicated to Moore's philosophical work might include detailed bibliographies. Examples include works like "G.E. Moore: Essays in Retrospect" edited by Alice Ambrose and Morris Lazerowitz, and "The Philosophy of G.E. Moore" edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp.

These resources should provide a strong starting point for accessing a comprehensive bibliography and understanding the breadth of G.E. Moore's philosophical contributions.

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